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Introduction 
We examine the impact of the corporate governance-default risk relationship on the demand 
for intermediated and non-intermediated debt in Australia. There is a relatively new but 
growing literature that links corporate governance, accounting information and debt 
contracting (Armstrong, Guay & Weber 2010). However, most of this research is United 
States (US) centric and has largely focused on the drivers of non-intermediated (public) debt 
pricing (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb 2004; Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins & LaFond 2006; Bhojraj 
& Sengupta 2003; Mansi, Maxwell & Miller 2004; Sengupta 1998). In contrast, the 
Australian corporate debt market is dominated by intermediated or private debt, with 
relatively low levels of non-intermediated debt (Reserve Bank of Australia 2005). More 
importantly, the Australian debt market arguably has lower inherent information asymmetry, 
relative to other countries, due to the continuous disclosure regulations which ensure private 
lenders have greater access to financial information (Gray et al. 2009). Despite this unique 
market characteristic, recent research finds good accruals quality reduces the cost of debt 
(Aldamen & Duncan 2011b; Gray et al. 2009) but governance and default risk only impact 
the cost of non-intermediated (not intermediated) debt (Aldamen & Duncan 2011a). However, 
as Armstrong et al.’s, (2010) review notes, to date the literature has generally ignored the 
relationship between other debt contracting parameters, such as the demand for different 
types of debt, and the firm’s corporate governance and accounting information characteristics. 
We address this gap in the literature and build on the work of Aldamen and Duncan (2011a) 
to explore the impact of different corporate governance-default risk relationships on the 
demand for different types of debt. 
Wang and Lin (2010) find that default risk reduces significantly as the number of 
corporate governance provisions adopted increases. Furthermore, Armstrong et al.’s, (2010) 
review suggests that different segments in the debt market (i.e. debt types and lenders in each 
category) have different corporate governance-default risk preferences and that this 
heterogeneity is a function of firms’ economic characteristics. Firms will demand more of the 
debt type that matches their extant governance-default risk characteristics. In our analysis we 
focus on the relative levels of each debt type across firms, rather than capital structure 
questions that are dealt with extensively elsewhere, and distinguish between two broad debt 
types, intermediated and non-intermediated debt (Cantillo &and Wright 2000; Denis & 
Mihov 2003). The greater monitoring information available to Australian intermediated debt 
providers potentially reduces the default risk mitigating effect of good corporate governance 
and differentially impacts the demand for intermediated versus non-intermediated debt 
relative to debt providers in other countries.  
One of the core differences between intermediated and non-intermediated debt is the 
role of the intermediary versus the market. Intermediated debt requires a third party 
intermediary to facilitate the debt contracting process between lenders and borrowers 
(Warner 1989) and the main types of intermediated debt in Australia are asset finance debt, 
bank debt and non-bank debt (Aldamen & Duncan 2011a). Asset finance debt includes 
finance leases and hire purchase finance. Bank debt is composed of bank loans, facilities and 
overdrafts, while non-bank debt includes loans from non-bank financial institutions, directors 
and related entities. Non-intermediated debt includes publicly traded debt instruments that are 
issued directly to lenders without intermediation, such as corporate bonds and other 
placements such as convertible and non-convertible commercial papers and notes.  
For intermediated debt the intermediary performs much of the market’s role (for non-
intermediated debt) and assesses and monitors the borrower’s risk and determines the 
optimum contracting terms (Diamond 1984). Given the supervisory role of the intermediary, 
intermediated debt is also referred to as highly monitored debt (Majumdar & Sen 2006, 2007; 
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Rauh & Sufi 2008). Monitoring by the intermediary provides an alternative form of control 
and thus mitigates the demand for formal corporate governance mechanisms such as those 
recommended by the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) (Armstrong et al. 2010; Berger 
& Udell 2002; Bhattacharya & Chiesa 1995; Diamond 1984; Fama 1985; James 1987; Leland 
& Pyle 1977). It is, however, an empirical question whether or not lower demand for 
monitoring translates to lower governance in place for companies with high levels of 
intermediated debt. In contrast, non-intermediated debt is characterised by a lower 
monitoring intensity, reflective of the borrower’s lower risk position (Cantillo & Wright 2000; 
Denis & Mihov 2003; Diamond,1991). Lower monitoring, however, could in turn result in 
increased information asymmetry between the debt contracting parties, adversely impacting 
demand for non-intermediated debt. We propose that higher levels of corporate governance 
mitigate this effect and positively impact demand for non-intermediated debt.  
The research question we pose is whether in Australia’s debt market, a unique 
monitoring environment dominated by intermediated debt, the nature of the governance-
default risk relationship differentially impacts the demand for intermediated and non-
intermediated debt. We address this question and extend the predominantly US empirical 
evidence on the drivers of demand for different debt types in a market dominated by 
intermediated debt. While there are many debt demand drivers, we draw on the work of 
Aldamen and Duncan (2011a) and explore the role of corporate governance and default risk 
as the two primary drivers. We contribute to the literature by modelling a two stage process 
whereby governance mitigates default risk and this modified risk drives demand for four 
intermediated and non-intermediated debt types. Our methodology explicitly recognises 
potential endogeneity issues and estimates a system of equations by identifying the correct 
channel of governance and risk in the demand for intermediated and non-intermediated debt.3  
Thus our evidence is more robust than much of the prior work. We also contribute to the 
literature by examining the governance-default risk relation in a market that is systematically 
different to the prior US centric literature.  
We examine the relative proportion of each type of debt contracted by 595 non-
financial Australian companies. The analysis finds that companies with higher levels of 
corporate governance have lower levels of default risk. We use the predicted default risk 
score from our stage one analysis in subsequent analysis and find that estimated default risk 
is negatively related to the demand for all debt types: asset finance, bank debt, non-bank debt 
and non-intermediated debt, albeit that the relationship between default risk and non-
intermediated debt is insignificant. Our cross-sectional evidence suggests that higher 
corporate governance impacts demand for debt via the mitigation of default risk. Although 
this relationship is uniformly positive, the magnitude of the impact is not uniform across all 
debt types. Bank and asset finance debt are more responsive to changes in risk levels than 
non-bank and non-intermediated debt. As risk increases the level of bank debt and asset 
finance that companies can contract decreases at a faster rate than for non-bank and non-
intermediated debt. Our evidence suggests that while all debt categories are responsive to the 
governance-default risk characteristics of the firm, a firm with higher default risk is more 
likely to obtain debt from non-banking institutions or non-intermediated providers. 
Traditional debt providers, banks and asset finance lenders, are more risk averse, as one 
would expect, than the less constrained non-bank debt providers. Hence they are more 
responsive to the governance-default risk relation. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The second section reviews prior 
literature and distils the key theoretical relationships between corporate governance, default 
                                                 
3 Endogeneity issues plague much of the governance (see Brown et al. 2011 for a review) and more generally 
accounting (see Larcker & Rusticus 2010)for a review) and finance (see Bhagat & Bolton 2008). 
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risk and demand for the different debt types. The third section develops the analytical models 
tested in the study. The fourth section describes the research design which includes the 
sample, variables and the empirical methods. The fifth section presents the estimation of the 
models and results discussion. The final section offers a summary and conclusion to the paper. 
 
Literature Review 
 
It is well established in the literature that default risk is a significant driver of debt contracting 
outcomes (Anderson et al. 2004; Byun 2007; Denis & Mihov 2003; Klock, Mansi & Maxwell 
2005). However, it is less clear how corporate governance will impact this relationship and 
the demand for different types of debt, although there is some evidence to suggest 
governance reduces default risk (Wang & Lin 2010) and hence increases the demand for less 
risk-sensitive debt.4 To develop our core proposition we briefly review the prior studies that 
link default risk and access to debt and then examine how corporate governance influences 
the drivers of default risk thereby influencing demand for debt. Grenadier (1996) finds that 
higher levels of default risk impact negatively on secured debt types such as finance lease 
contracts. Smith (1987) suggests that firms with high default risk encounter difficulties in 
obtaining bank debt. Furthermore, companies that have low default risk, are larger, older and 
more successful, tend to demand non-intermediated debt such as corporate bonds and notes 
(Cantillo & Wright 2000; Denis & Mihov 2003; Diamond 1991). Collectively the evidence 
suggests that higher levels of default risk restrict demand for all four debt types. 
A reduction in risk can be achieved by targeting the drivers of that risk. One of the 
significant determinants of default risk is the company’s cash flow uncertainty (Aziz, 
Emanuel & Lawson 1988; Gentry, Newbold & Whitford 1985; Scott 1981; Trueman & 
Titman 1988). Prior research finds a negative relationship between cash flow uncertainty and 
default risk (Zeitun, Tian & Kean 2007). Minton and Schrand (1999) show that cash flow 
fluctuations defer capital expenditures and delay debt repayments thereby increasing default 
risk. The underlying theory is that agency conflicts between managers and stakeholders 
increase the variance in expected cash flows thereby increasing default risk (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003). Managers that are focused on advancing their 
self-interest are likely to engage in shirking, over-consumption of perquisites, empire 
building and unprofitable investments in negative net present value projects (Bhojraj & 
Sengupta 2003; Dechow & Sloan 1991; Fan 2004; Jensen & Meckling 1976; Sengupta 1998; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The adverse effects of such self-seeking managerial behaviour 
reduces the firm’s expected cash flows and increases default risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003; Jensen & Meckling1976; Sengupta 1998). 
It is recognised in the literature and embodied in regulatory provisions worldwide that 
implementing good corporate governance practices mitigates the agency costs of self-serving 
managers (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Bhojraj & Sengupta 2003). We define corporate 
governance as the methods employed by the owners via the board of directors to mitigate the 
debt agency conflict and to align the interests of managers and owners with those of the 
debtholders. Good corporate governance consists of many systems and process that elevate 
the monitoring and control functions in the firm thereby reducing default risk (Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al. 2006; Byun 2007). Corporate governance practices also enhance the disclosure 
of quality financial information, thereby bridging the information gap between stakeholders 
(Armstrong et al. 2010; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Beekes & Brown 2006; Bhojraj & 
Sengupta 2003; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy & Wright 2004; Sengupta 1998). Higher levels of 
corporate governance mitigate agency conflicts and reduce information asymmetry between 
                                                 
4 See Aldamen et al. (2010) for a discussion on the drivers of default risk. 
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managers and investors, thereby impacting variances in expected cash flows and lowering 
default risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Schultz, Tan & Walsh 2011; Wang & Lin 2010). 
As a result, higher levels of corporate governance are expected to increase demand for all 
types of debt.  
A more sophisticated proposition is that corporate governance has a differential 
impact on demand for debt and depends on the degree to which governance mitigates default 
risk in relation to each type of debt: intermediated versus non-intermediated. In particular, 
given the differences in monitoring environment there is an argument that the expected 
impact of corporate governance on non-intermediated debt will be different to the more 
highly monitored intermediated debt. Uppal (2007) finds that extensive disclosure 
requirements and better governance are associated with larger bond markets (greater demand 
for non-intermediated debt). At the other end of the spectrum, demand for asset finance debt 
is not expected to increase in the presence of higher levels of corporate governance because 
asset finance providers’ capital is secured with assets pledged by borrowers (Grenadier, 
1996). As a result of this collateralised debt agreement, the monitoring and informational 
advantages associated with implementing corporate governance practices are less likely to be 
a factor in asset finance lending decisions. However, the evidence suggests otherwise with 
Robicheaux, Fu and Ligon (2008) finding that higher levels of corporate governance 
increases the demand for lease financing. This evidence discounts the differential corporate 
governance argument and instead suggests an alternative proposition that corporate 
governance has a positive influence on demand for all debt types via default risk mitigation. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on this conflicting expectation within the 
Australian debt market.  
 
Analytical Model 
 
We theorise that higher levels of corporate governance increase demand for all debt types by 
reducing managerial opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry thus reducing 
default risk (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Byun, 2007). That is, corporate governance 
systems and processes impact default risk (Wang and Lin, 2010) and this in turn impacts 
demand for different debt types as follows:   
 (1) 
 (2) 
where, default risk, , corresponds to the default risk measure for firm i in the 
sample and  represents the corporate governance signal j corresponding to 
the firm i in the sample. In equation (2) 
 
refers to the debt portfolio j corresponding to 
the respective firm i in the sample and includes both intermediated and non-intermediated 
types of debt. The alternative types of debt we examine are asset finance debt (ASFIN), bank 
debt (BANK), non-bank debt (NBANK) and non-intermediated debt (NONINT). Expanding 
equation (1) and (2) a simple simultaneous model of governance, risk and debt demand can 
be produced as follows: 
 (3) 
  (4) 
where, αs measure the impact of a vector of corporate governance systems and 
processes on the firm’s default risk. Similarly the βs measure the structural effects of 
corresponding risk variables to the relative debt type while controlling for other 
variables, , including collateral in place, age and size of the firms. Finally υ   and 
ε  are the error terms for equations (3) and (4) respectively. We derive a reduced form debt 
model by substituting  from equation (3) into equation (4). Therefore,   
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  5  
collecting terms
 
 6  
giving 
  7  
where, s are the reduced coefficients measuring the effect of corporate governance 
on demand for the j different debt types. Equation (7) is the reduced equation in implied non-
linear form which models debt demand for each type as a function of governance 
characteristics and controls. In order to estimate the structural parameters we adopt a two 
stage method of estimation. In stage one, we estimate the corporate governance and risk 
model shown by equation (3) and substitute the estimated   for default risk  in 
equation (4) in stage two. Thus the estimable equations can be reproduced as in the following 
equations 3  and 4 . 
 (3 ) 
  (4 ) 
The dependant variable, , in equation 4 represents either a categorical variable 
for intermediated versus non-intermediated debt (CHOICE) or the demand for each of the 
four debt types: asset finance debt (ASFIN), bank debt (BANK), non-bank debt (NBANK) and 
non-intermediated debt (NONINT). In stage two of the analysis we examine whether 
estimated default risk,  from stage one, is related to the demand for different debt 
types via individual models for each debt type (ie equations 4 a, 4 b, 4 c and 4 d below).  
 (4 a) 
  (4 b) 
  (4 c) 
  (4 d) 
Finally, we estimate these equations as a system of equations and impose cross 
equation constraints to test the relative magnitude of the risk impacts for each debt type. 
 
Data and Variables 
 
The sample consists of public companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange in 2007, 
the last available year prior to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 – 2009. Only one year’s 
worth of data is used because corporate governance characteristics tend to be sticky and not 
change very quickly over time (Black, Jang & Kim 2006; Brown, Beekes & Verhoeven 2011). 
The initial sample frame which includes 1,824 listed companies is reduced to 595 companies 
after applying data and sample constraints.5 The data is collected from annual reports and 
database information from AspectHuntley’s DatAnalysis and FinAnalysis and Thomson 
Reuters Tick History (TRTH).  
 
Debt Types  
 
Demand for the different debt types is measured by the company’s relative ability to contract 
intermediated or non-intermediated debt. At an aggregate level, this is captured as a binary 
                                                 
5 The sample was reduced by the following restrictions: (1) 257 companies from the banking, insurance and 
financial sectors are excluded; (2) 328 companies without a 30 June balance date are excluded; (3) 618 
companies without interest bearing debt are excluded; (4) 16 companies did not report cost of debt in their 
annual reports; (5) 10 outliers were omitted( see McDonald 1973; Subramanyam 1996). 
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variable, CHOICE ,which is one if more than 50% of the company’s debt financing is non-
intermediated debt and zero otherwise. CHOICE therefore represents those firms with the 
majority of their debt being non-intermediated debt. To capture the richness in the data, debt 
types are separated into demand for asset finance debt (ASFIN), bank debt (BANK), non-bank 
debt (NBANK) and non-intermediated debt (NONINT). Demand for the different debt types 
are measured as the proportion of each debt type relative to the total interest bearing debt for 
the firm (Bougheas, Mizen & Yalcin 2006; Cantillo & Wright 2000; Denis & Mihov 2003; 
González, Lopez & Saurina 2007) as defined below: 
 (a) 
 (b) 
 (c) 
 (d) 
where,  corresponds to asset finance debt for firm i which includes hire 
purchase and finance lease liabilities, 
 
refers to bank debt for firm i which includes 
bank loans, facilities, and overdraft, and  denotes non-bank debt for firm i which 
includes loans made by non-bank financial institutions. Similarly,  is non-
intermediated debt for firm i which includes commercial papers, notes, and bonds and finally 
 is the total interest bearing debt for firm i.  
 
Default Risk 
 
We employ an accounting-based measure of default risk for several reasons. Firstly, the study 
is motivated by Armstrong et al.’s (2010) call for further investigation of the relationship 
between accounting information and debt contracting. Secondly, there is an extensive body of 
accounting literature that links the quality of a firm’s governance ‘mosaic’ (board, audit 
committee, internal auditor, external auditor and management characteristics) and financial 
reporting quality (Cohen et al. 2004). The quality of a firm’s accounting information is the 
link between its level of corporate governance, default risk and type of debt demanded which 
is captured by our accounting ratio based default risk measure. Finally, while there are 
alternative market risk measures such as bond ratings (for non-intermediated debt), share 
price changes and recent multi-factor models (Schultz et al. 2011; Wu et al. 2010), our focus 
is on governance-enhanced accounting information and hence we use an accounting based 
risk measure rather than the most comprehensive or predictive default model per se.  
Default risk, DRISK, is measured via an accounting ratio based out-of-sample 
Australian Z-score model identified using multivariate linear discriminant (MLD) consistent 
with extensive prior literature (Altman, 1968, 1983). A paired sample of failed and non-failed 
Australian companies that are similar in size, industry and time period are employed to 
estimate a five factor accounting ratio model. The five accounting ratios are working capital 
to total assets (WORKCAP), retained earnings to total assets (RETEARN), earnings before 
interest and tax to total assets (ROA), book value of total debt to total assets (LEVERAGE) 
and sales to total assets (ASSTURN).6  The estimated DRISK captures both the profitability 
(via retained earnings, return on assets and turnover) and financial risk (via leverage and 
working capital) dimensions of each firm. Hence we do not include additional controls for 
profitability or financial risk in the analysis.7 To enhance clarity, the estimated DRISK is 
                                                 
6 The estimated Z-score model is 0.38 0.16 2.05 3.06
2.91 1.09  . 
7 Although the other controls include a collateral variable this is not significantly correlated with leverage. 
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multiplied by negative one. The transformed DRISK ranges from -3.73 to 4.58 with a high 
DRISK representing high default risk and a low or negative score representing low default 
risk. 
 
Corporate Governance  
 
To capture the multi-faceted nature of the corporate governance construct we draw on 
fourteen individual governance variables identified in the prior literature and shown in Table 
1 (Aldamen & Duncan 2011a; Ang, Cole  & Wuh Lin 2000; Daily & Dalton 1994; Davidson, 
Bouresli & Singh 2006; Fama & Jensen 1983a, 1983b; Kent & Stewart 2008). The 
governance measures include board independence, duality of the role of board chair and chief 
executive officer, board size, board meeting, the presence of a nomination committee, the 
presence of a remuneration committee, audit committee independence, financial expertise of 
the audit committee, audit committee meetings, size of audit committee, audit committee 
charter, identity of external auditor, blockholders and insider ownership.  
One of the issues facing governance researchers is the dimensionality of the corporate 
governance construct (Brown et al. 2011). We follow the approach by Larcker, Richardson 
and Tuna (2007) and Aldamen and Duncan (2011a) and utilise principal component analysis 
(PCA) to compute two corporate governance factors which summarise the fourteen individual 
corporate governance variables. Eleven variables are included in PCA but three variables are 
excluded due to low sampling adequacy and Eigen values that are below 1. The eleven 
variables show a Kaiser Meyer Olkin (KMO) score of approximately 0.5. The overall 
sampling adequacy measure KMO is 0.856 and the Bartlett’s test of Sphericity is significant 
at one percent level of significance indicating that the model is appropriate for PCA. 
Furthermore, the rotation sums of square loading shows that two factors are extracted and 
they explain 65 percent of variance in the corporate governance variables. Table 1 reports the 
respective factor loading for each corporate governance variable. The two factors, labelled 
GOV1 and GOV2, are employed as the governance proxy measures in all subsequent analysis. 
GOV1 captures the audit committee and board oversight (remuneration and nomination 
committee) components of the corporate governance for the firm. While GOV2 captures the 
size related elements of governance, namely board size and independence and frequency of 
hiring a Big4 auditor. The audit-oversight and size governance dimensions are consistent 
with the first two factors of Aldamen and Duncan (2011a, 2011b) and are key aspects of the 
governance ‘mosaic’ identified in much of the prior accounting governance, debt contracting 
and financial reporting literature (Armstrong et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 2004). 
 
Controls  
 
We also employ the typical controls for company age, collateral and size.8 Company age, 
AGE, a proxy for reputation, is defined as the number of years since incorporation (Diamond, 
1989; Pittman and Fortin, 2004). We expect AGE to be negatively related to the level of asset 
finance but positively related to other debt types. Young firms will have a higher proportion 
of leased assets relative to older more established firms that can use one or more of the other 
debt types. We also employ a control for collateral. Asset collateral provides the borrower 
with greater access to credit markets (Bougheas et al. 2006) and impacts perceived risk and 
                                                 
8 Profitability and leverage are also considered significant drivers of cost of debt. However, ZSCORE, measured 
as a composition of different accounting ratios, includes return on assets which is a common profitability 
measure and debt to asset which is a leverage measure. As a result, the study does not include separate 
profitability and leverage control variables. 
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thus should be positively related to debt type demanded. In accordance with prior research, 
we measure collateral, COLLT, as property plant and equipment divided by total assets 
(Berger, Ofek & Yermack 1997; Wen, Rwegasira & Bilderbeek 2002). As well as being a 
standard control, company size is an important factor which influences the relationship 
between corporate governance practices and demand for all debt types (Brewer 2007; 
Cantillo & Wright, 2000; Minton & Schrand 1999). We measure company size, SIZE, as the 
log of total assets (Pittman & Fortin 2004; Sengupta 1998) which is expected to be positively 
related to debt types.  
Table 1 
Corporate Governance Variables and Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Variable 
Name Variable Description  
Principal Components 
GOV1 GOV2 
INDP Proportion of non-executive independent 
directors on the board. 
 0.723 
DUAL One if the CEO is separate from chair of the 
board, and zero otherwise. 
BDSIZE Number of directors on the board.  0.787 
BDMEET Number of board meetings. 0.575  
NOM One if the company has a nomination 
committee, and zero otherwise. 
0.537  
REM One if company has a remuneration 
committee, and zero otherwise. 
0.693  
AUDCHRT One if the company has an audit committee 
charter, and zero otherwise. 
0.658  
AUDIND Proportion of non-executive independent 
members on the audit committee. 
0.640  
AUDEXP Proportion of audit committee members 
with accounting and finance qualifications. 
0.549  
AUDSIZE Number of directors on audit committee. 0.634  
AUDMEET Number of audit committee meetings. 0.600  
AUDITOR One if the auditor is a Big Four, and zero 
otherwise. 
 0.675 
BLOCK 
Percentage of shares owned by investors 
owning 5 percent or more of the company’s 
shares. 
INSIDER Percentage of company’s shares owned by 
insiders. 
Note: PCA procedure: Varimax Rotation with Kaiser Normalization 
Three variables, DUAL, BLOCK and INSIDER were dropped from the Principle 
Components Analysis. 
 
Estimation and Result Discussion  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 reports the aggregate levels for each debt type (i.e. asset finance, bank debt, non-bank 
debt and non-intermediated debt). The aggregate debt types are further broken into short-term 
and long-term debt where the former comprises 21% of total interest bearing debt while the 
latter makes up 79%. Additionally, non-intermediated debt, which includes convertible and 
non-convertible notes, bonds and commercial paper, comprises the largest debt type in terms 
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of aggregate value at $54.2 billion or 43.3% of total interest bearing debt. Bank debt which 
includes bank loans, facilities and overdrafts totals $42.4 billion or 33.9% of the total interest 
bearing debt thereby making it the second largest type of debt. Non-bank debt which includes 
loans from non-bank financial institutions, directors and related entities is the third largest 
debt type at $24.2 billion or 19.3% of total interest bearing debt. Finally, asset finance which 
is represented by finance lease and hire purchases amounts to $4.3 billion or 3.4% of total 
interest bearing debt making it the smallest debt type relative to the other types of debt. 
However these aggregate dollar levels are distorted by firm size and can be misleading. 
Hence we measure the demand for the different debt types as the proportion of each debt type 
relative to the total interest bearing debt for the firm. Thus our analysis is based on the 
relative demand for each type of debt in a firm’s debt funding mix rather than the dollar value 
per se. This allows us to compare the cross-sectional association between relative debt levels 
and the governance-default risk driver.  
Table 2 
Breakdown of Interest Bearing Debt by Type and Term 
 
Type (Billions) % of Total 
Short Term Debt   
(i)   Asset finance $1.0 0.8 
(ii)  Bank 16.4 13.1 
(iii) Non-bank 3.4 2.7 
(iv) Non-intermediated 5.9 4.7 
Total 26.7 21.3 
Long Term Debt   
(i)   Asset finance 3.3 2.6 
(ii)  Bank 26.0 20.8 
(iii) Non-bank 20.8 16.6 
(iv) Non-intermediated 48.3 38.6 
Total 98.4 78.7 
Total Interest Bearing Debt $125.1 100.0 
Note: N=595 firms. The largest 20 companies account for $47.8 billion of the total non-
intermediated (88% of the total $54.2 billion in non-intermediated debt). 
 
The binary variable CHOICE represents the aggregate demand for non-intermediated 
versus intermediated debt and equals one if the majority of the company’s debt is non-
intermediated and zero otherwise. The results reported in Table 3 show 116 companies have a 
majority of non-intermediated debt. Demand for the different debt types is further examined 
by the use of four variables which represent the proportion of each debt type relative to the 
total interest bearing debt as presented in Table 3. The dominant type of debt accessed is 
BANK, with a mean of 33% across the sample. The mean proportion of total interest bearing 
is similar across the other three debt types: ASFIN, NBANK and NONINT. However the mix 
of debt varies across companies as indicated by the wide range for each type of debt with 
different companies having between zero to one hundred percent of each kind of interest 
bearing debt. That is, some companies have only ASFIN or only NONINT and so on while 
other companies have more of a mix. The median levels also imply most companies have 
some form of BANK debt. 
Descriptive statistics for DRISK and the controls are also reported in Table 3. The 
mean for default risk, DRISK, is 0.49 and ranges from -3.73 to 4.58. AGE ranges between 1 
and 124 years with an average of 19.98 years. The collateral control, COLLT, has a mean of 
0.33 and ranges between zero and 1.18. The average SIZE is 7.78 which equates to assets of 
about $60 million.  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Mean Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
ASFIN   0.27 0.03 0.40 0.00 1.00 
BANK   0.33 0.01 0.41 0.00 1.00 
NBANK  0.19 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
NONINT1   0.20 0.00 0.35 0.00 1.00 
CHOICE 2 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00 
DRISK  0.49 0.75 1.46 -3.73 4.58 
AGE   19.98 15.00 18.33 1.00 124.00 
COLLT  0.33 0.26 0.29 0.00 1.18 
SIZE  7.78 7.67 0.93 5.71 10.87 
Note: N: 595 
1183 companies have some non-intermediated debt in their finance mix which represents 31% of the 
total sample. Of these 38 or 6.4% of the sample have only non-intermediated debt.  
2 CHOICE equals 1 if the majority of the company’s debt is non-intermediated and zero otherwise. 116 
companies have a majority non-intermediated debt. 
 
 
Corporate Governance and Default Risk 
 
Stage one of the analysis tests whether corporate governance is related to default risk. The 
results presented in Table 4 indicate that GOV1 (audit and board oversight governance) and 
GOV2 (size related governance such as board size, independence and Big4 auditor) are 
negatively related to DRISK at the 1% significance level. This implies that an increase in both 
audit-oversight and size aspects of corporate governance results in a decrease in default risk 
as expected. Similar results are reported by Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003), Wang and Lin 
(2010) and Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) who also find that corporate governance decreases 
default risk. We save the estimated values for default risk, , and use them in the next 
phase of the analysis.  
 
Default Risk and Demand for Debt Types 
 
Stage two of the analysis examines whether estimated default risk, , is related to the 
demand for different debt types. We estimate equations (4′a through d) for the four debt 
types. The results shown in Table 4 suggest that ASFIN is negatively related to  at the 
5% significance level. This indicates that a decrease in  results in an increase in 
ASFIN. Additionally, AGE and SIZE are negatively related to ASFIN at the 1% significance 
level which indicates that the demand for asset secured finance such as lease liabilities and 
hire purchase decreases with an increase in company age and size. For BANK, the  
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 5% significance level. Demand for 
bank debt therefore increases when estimated default risk decreases. Additionally, SIZE is 
positively related to BANK which indicates that demand for bank debt increases as companies 
become larger. The results in Table 4 suggest that NBANK and  are negatively related 
at the 10% significance level. This further supports the overall negative relationship between 
estimated default risk and demand for all intermediated debt types. Finally the relationship 
between NONINT and  is negative, but unlike the previous default risk-debt type 
relationships, it is not statistically significant. The final model relates the choice of 
intermediated versus non-intermediated debt to the debt choice drivers , age, collateral 
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and size. The results show that a significantly negative relationship between debt type, 
CHOICE, and estimated default risk. The significant negative coefficient means that 
companies with higher estimated default risk are more likely to choose intermediated debt. 
This implies that the proportion of intermediated debt is more sensitive to the governance-
default risk relation, , than is the case for non-intermediated debt.   
 
Table 4 
Corporate Governance, Default Risk and Demand for Debt Types 
 
STAGE ONE (Equation 3/) STAGE TWO (Equation 4/) 
  DRISK ASFIN BANK NBANK NONINT CHOICEv 
Intercept 
4.269*** 
(0.00) 
1.359*** 
(0.00) 
-0.423*** 
(0.00) 
0.183 
(0.30) 
-0.089 
(0.79) 
0.043 
(0.16) 
GOV1 
-0.216*** 
(0.00) 
 
GOV2 
-0.171*** 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.084** 
(0.03) 
-0.076** 
(0.04) 
-0.05* 
 (0.10) 
-0.104 
(0.16) 
-0.026** 
(0.01) 
AGE 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.40) 
0.002** 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.84) 
-0.001*** 
(0.00) 
COLLT 
 
0.070 
(0.21) 
-0.042 
(0.49) 
0.080 
(0.25) 
-0.026 
(0.74) 
0.04* 
(0.06) 
SIZE 
 
-0.129*** 
(0.00) 
0.101*** 
(0.00) 
-0.005 
(0.83) 
0.041 
(0.31) 
0.02** 
(0.02) 
Adj. R-Squared 0.21 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.09 
F-statistic 
33.17*** 
(0.00) 
14.09*** 
(0.00) 
11.84*** 
(0.00) 
2.684** 
(0.03) 
12.01*** 
(0.00) 
2.48** 
(0.04) 
Obs*R2 
0.32 
(0.85) 
0.05  
(0.82) 
2.12  
(0.15) 
6.60 
(0.16) 
2.87 
(0.57) 
16.22 
(0.30) 
Notes: 
i. Stage One refers to the corporate governance and default risk model corresponding to equation 
(3/).  
ii. Stage Two presents estimates of default risk (estimated) and debt type model equation (4/a-d) plus 
a fifth model where the dependant variable is the binary CHOICE variable (see vi below).  
iii. The corporate governance components have been reduced to two factors using principal 
component method. These reduced factors satisfy all necessary properties before to be utilized in 
the stage one estimates.  
iv. ***, ** and * respectively significant at 1 %, 5% and 10% level of significance. P-values are 
presented in brackets. 
v. We pass these estimates through the battery of different statistical tests including F-statistics 
showing overall significance of the coefficients corresponding to each model estimated in the 
above. Further we take care of heteroskedasticity the potential problem in cross-sectional 
estimations. White hetroskedasticity test and Breusch-Pagan Godfrey Tests produce the consistent 
results and do not allow to reject the null hypothesis of no hetroskedasticity shown as Obs*R2  
vi. CHOICE is a binary variable defined as one if the company has more than 50% of its financing 
mix from non-intermediate debt and zero otherwise. 116 or 19.5% of the companies in the sample 
have more than 50% non-intermediated debt. 
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To more fully explore the implications of this result we re-estimate the stage two 
system of equations with cross equation restrictions to test the hypothesis that the coefficient 
for  is equal for all debt types. The results reported in Table 5 show that all risk 
coefficients corresponding to ASFIN, BANK, NBANK and NONINT are significantly different 
from each other. To determine the relative impact of governance-default risk across the debt 
types we impose pairwise restrictions on the cross equation  coefficients. The results 
in Table 5 show that 11  and  are not different from each other suggesting governance-
default risk has a similar impact on the demand for both ASFIN and BANK debt. We also find 
that parameters 11  and   are not significantly different which implies the demand for non-
bank debt, NBANK, and non-intermediated debt, NONINT, have a similar responsiveness to 
the governance-default risk relation. 
We also find that the estimated coefficient 1 is significantly larger than both 11  and 
which means that the level of asset finance, ASFIN, is more responsive to increases in 
governance-default risk than both NBANK and NONINT. Similarly the coefficient for 1 is 
significantly larger than both 1 and 1 . The statistical results in Table 5 suggest the following 
relationship between the parameters: 1111   . In total these results imply that there is 
a cascading effect of governance-default risk across the debt types. The governance-default 
risk relation has a larger impact on the proportion of ASFIN and BANK relative to NBANK 
and NONINT debt. The evidence from the restricted estimation is consistent with the 
CHOICE model and suggests that a higher governance-default risk relation has more of an 
impact on the proportion of ASFIN, BANK and NBANK debt relative to NONINT. Overall 
these results are consistent with governance mitigating accounting based measure of default 
risk and the resultant risk negatively impacting debt levels, more so for asset finance and 
bank debt than non-bank and non-intermediated debt. Hence we can conclude that 
governance positively impacts asset and bank debt more than non-bank and non-
intermediated debt. 
Table 5 
Cross Equation Restrictions to Test Differential Impact of Governance-Default Risk on Debt Type 
Demanded 
 
Coefficient Hypothesis 
)(
2
valueP
Test


 Decision Comments 
11111
11110
:
:




H
H
 
64.31 
(000) 
Reject 0H   All risk coefficients 111 ,,  and 1
corresponding to ASFIN, BANK, NBANK 
and NONINT are different from each other. 
111
110
:
:




H
H
 
0.0002 
(0.985) 
Fail to reject 
0H  
1 and 1  are not statistically different 
from each other.  
111
110
:
:




H
H
 
0.268 
(0.604) 
Fail to reject 
0H  
11 and are not statistically different 
from each other. 
111
110
:
:




H
H 29.10 
(0.000) 
Reject 0H  11 and  are different from each other 
and 1  is relatively greater than 1 . 
111
110
:
:




H
H 34.30 
(0.000) 
Reject 0H  11  and  are different from each other 
and 1 is relatively greater than 1 . 
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111
110
:
:




H
H 29.93 
(0.000) 
Reject 0H  11 and are different from each other 
and 1  is relatively greater than 1 . 
111
110
:
:




H
H 35.05 
(0.000) 
Reject 0H  11 and are different from each other and
1  is relatively greater than 1 . 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance, via default risk 
mitigation, on the demand for different debt types in Australia. Companies choose between 
intermediated debt, such as asset finance, bank debt and non-bank debt, and non-
intermediated debt. While there are many potential drivers for this choice we explore the role 
of governance and default risk, two primary drivers, on the relative proportion of each type of 
debt contracted by companies in a two-stage analysis.  
The results for stage one show that companies with higher levels of corporate 
governance have lower levels of default risk, consistent with the prior evidence (Wang & Lin 
2010). We use the predicted default risk from our stage one analysis to examine the 
differential demand for four debt types. The results for stage two show that estimated default 
risk is negatively related to asset finance, bank debt, non-bank debt and non-intermediated 
debt. However, the relationship between default risk and non-intermediated debt is 
insignificant. Our cross-sectional evidence suggests that firms with higher levels of corporate 
governance also exhibit lower default risk and this is associated with firms demanding higher 
levels of all of the intermediated debt types. Similar results are reported by Bougheas et al. 
(2006) who conclude that firms with higher default risk contract lower levels of bank debt. 
Furthermore, Gonzalez, Lopez and Saurina (2007) find that default risk is negatively related 
to the demand for bank debt but the relationship is not statistically significant. In contrast we 
find a significant negative relationship with all intermediated debt types. 
Regulators can benefit from this analysis as it provides evidence with respect to the 
value of corporate governance. Companies that engage in costly governance practices expect 
payback benefits including improved financial stability, lower default risk, reduced 
information asymmetry, improved information quality and thus improved decision making 
(Aldamen, Duncan & McNamara 2010). More specifically one would expect governance to 
impact demand for debt over and above other firm specific factors. Our results suggest that 
corporate governance impacts access to intermediated and non-intermediated debt for 
Australian companies via the mitigation of default risk. However this relationship is not 
uniform across debt types. The demand for both bank and asset finance debt is more 
responsive to changes in governance-default risk levels than non-bank and non-intermediated 
debt. As default risk increases the level of bank debt and asset finance that companies can 
contract decreases at a faster rate than for non-bank and non-intermediated debt. So while all 
debt categories are responsive to the governance-default risk characteristics of the firm, if a 
firm has higher risk it is more likely to obtain debt from non-banking institutions or non-
intermediated providers. Traditional debt providers, banks and asset finance lenders, are more 
risk averse, as one would expect, than the less constrained non-bank debt providers. Hence 
the level of corporate governance potentially has a larger impact on the demand for these 
intermediated debt types relative to other types of debt. 
We expected that Australia’s intermediated debt market, with its unique continuous 
disclosure requirements, might not be as responsive to governance as other markets such as 
the US where non-intermediated debt is more prevalent. The increased monitoring by 
intermediaries, in the banking sector in particular, serves as an alternative form of control and 
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thus mitigates the demand for formal corporate governance mechanisms (Aldamen & Duncan 
2011a; Armstrong et al. 2010). The US public debt market, the focus of much prior research, 
is likely to be more responsive to governance than the Australian market. However our 
findings suggest that higher levels of corporate governance mitigate default risk even in 
Australia’s information-rich intermediated debt market. This supports the ASX’s pursuit of 
governance best practices within the local market.  
Finally our analysis has implications for future research. The differential impact of 
governance and default risk on demand for different debt types suggests that researchers need 
to control for this non-uniform relationship when examining debt contracting. Researchers 
need to control for the co-variation between governance and default risk via instrumental or 
two-stage analysis by first modelling the risk drivers then the impact of this relationship on 
the focus variables of the research. However, the current cross-sectional study is but one 
limited piece of evidence. Future research needs to consider the relationship over time to shed 
further light on the causal links between changes in governance and resultant changes in debt 
contracting outcomes.  
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